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THE CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST IN SINGAPORE 
Five Persistent Puzzles 
This paper investigates some persistent difficulties 
surrounding the constructive trust. The five persistent 
puzzles relating to the constructive trust that are considered 
in this paper are: the terminology puzzle, the institutional 
and remedial puzzle, the explanatory puzzle, the bankruptcy 
puzzle and the Torrens puzzle. It is the author’s thesis that 
these five enduring puzzles must be addressed and ultimately 
unravelled in order to ensure the coherent development of 
the law in this area. 
TANG Hang Wu∗ 
PhD, LLM (Cambridge), LLB (National University of Singapore); 
Advocate & Solicitor (Singapore), Solicitor (England & Wales); 
Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore. 
I. Introduction 
1 The constructive trust is one of the most difficult areas of equity 
jurisprudence. Yet the constructive trust is a form of relief frequently 
requested by litigants. It is easy to see why many plaintiffs seek a 
declaration of constructive trust in their statement of claim; such a 
declaration would grant a plaintiff a proprietary remedy with all its 
attendant benefits. In other words, a plaintiff who succeeds in a claim of 
constructive trust would have priority over the rest of the defendant’s 
creditors in circumstances where the defendant is insolvent. 
Furthermore, any increase in value of the property concerned would 
accrue to the plaintiff by reason of the constructive trust.1 Despite the 
popularity of constructive trust claims, the law in this area is far from 
clear. The terminology used in this context is often confused. Also, it is 
very difficult to discern general principles because a declaration of a 
constructive trust may arise in a myriad of circumstances. This problem 
is complicated by the fact that some judges have said that the law in this 
area has been deliberately left vague in order to deal with new 
situations.2 Such vagueness has proved to be a bane to judges, lawyers, 
law teachers and law students alike. It is hard to disagree with 
                                                                       
∗ The author is grateful to Prof Kevin Gray for his comments. The usual caveats 
apply. 
1 See eg Foskett v McKeown [2001] AC 102. 
2 Carl-Zeiss Stiftung v Herbert Smith (No 2) [1969] 2 Ch 276 at 300. 
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Lord Millett’s extra-judicial sentiments that “[t]he unsatisfactory and 
confused state into which the law in this area has fallen is little short of a 
disgrace. There has been a failure to analyse the principles on which 
liability is based, compounded by a weakness of factual analysis …”.3 
2 In this paper, I attempt to unpack some of the difficulties that 
have afflicted the law of constructive trust. The five persistent puzzles 
relating to the constructive trust that I consider in this paper are: the 
terminology puzzle, the institutional and remedial puzzle, the 
explanatory puzzle, the bankruptcy puzzle and the Torrens puzzle. It is 
important that these puzzles be unpacked in order to develop the law in 
this area coherently. Two caveats need to be stated from the outset of 
this paper. First, I have no doubt that there are many more unresolved 
difficulties inherent in the constructive trust which are not covered here. 
However, due to space constraints it is impossible for this paper to 
consider more than the five persistent puzzles identified. Second, it 
should be pointed out that some of these five puzzles could individually 
merit an entire paper or even a monograph. As such, the purpose of this 
paper is not to offer definitive solutions to all issues related to each 
puzzle. Where appropriate, I have attempted to clear away some of the 
confusion and suggested how the law should develop. Some of the issues 
raised in the five puzzles are so complex and wide ranging (eg the 
bankruptcy and explanatory puzzles) that I am able only to scratch the 
surface of them by presenting an outline of the main arguments in these 
areas. The aim of this paper is merely to signpost the principal issues 
contained in these puzzles. It is hoped that this will form a framework 
for future consideration by the courts. 
II. The terminology puzzle 
3 A persistent difficulty in constructive trust analysis is the 
confusion over terminology. There is a tendency to conflate the 
constructive trust in a proprietary sense with a duty to account as a 
constructive trustee.4 This is most unfortunate because the confusion 
prevents clarity in the analysis. Traditionally, the term “constructive 
trust” has been used in two ways. First, the courts may declare that the 
defendant holds the property in question on trust for the plaintiff. In 
this instance, the relief given to the plaintiff is proprietary. Second, the 
term “constructive trust” may also be used to mean relief granted to the 
claimant against a defendant which is personal in nature, eg where the 
defendant is “liable to account as a constructive trustee” to the claimant. 
                                                                       
3 P J Millett, “Equity – The Road Ahead” (1995) 9 TLI 35 at 38. 
4 A lament made by P J Millett, “Equity – The Road Ahead” (1995) 9 TLI 35; L D Smith, 
“Constructive Trusts and Constructive Trustees” (1999) 58 CLJ 294; P J Millett, 
“Restitution and Constructive Trusts” (1998) 114 LQR 399. 
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Examples occur in the case of a defendant who: (a) intermeddles and 
voluntarily assumes the mantle of trusteeship (trustee de son tort); 
(b) dishonestly assists in a breach of trust or fiduciary duty; or 
(c) knowingly receives property that is impressed with a trust or 
fiduciary duty. The superimposition of the term “constructive trust” in 
these situations is simply a shorthand denoting a personal liability to 
account in equity.5 Professor Lionel Smith perceptively points out that 
the use of this formula perpetuates the pretence that beneficiaries can 
sue only their trustees.6 Used in this second sense, the constructive trust 
is non-proprietary in nature and signifies simply a duty to account. 
4 The use of the term “constructive trust” in the non-proprietary 
sense is unhelpful and has been deprecated by Lord Millett in Dubai 
Aluminium Co Ltd v Salaam.7 Lord Millett observed: 
In this second class of case the expressions ‘constructive trust’ and 
‘constructive trustee’ create a trap. As [Jules Sher QC, sitting as a 
deputy judge of the Chancery Division,] recently observed in 
Coulthard v Disco Mix Club Ltd [[1999] 2 All ER 457 at 479,] [2000] 
1 WLR 707 [at] 731 this ‘type of […] trust is merely the creation by 
the court … to meet the wrongdoing alleged: there is no real trust and 
usually no chance of a proprietary remedy’. The expressions are 
‘nothing more than a formula for equitable relief ’: Selangor United 
Rubber Estates Ltd v Cradock (No 3) [[1968] 2 All ER 1073 at 1097,] 
[1968] 1 WLR 1555 [at] 1582 per Ungoed-Thomas J. I think that we 
should now discard the words ‘accountable as constructive trustee’ in 
this context and substitute the words ‘accountable in equity’. 
5 Unfortunately, the conflation of both of these senses of 
constructive trust is found in Singaporean jurisprudence. In Comboni 
Vincenzo v Shankar’s Emporium (Pte) Ltd,8 there seems to be an 
intermingling of the elements of the constructive trust in a proprietary 
sense and the action based on knowing receipt. This decision will be 
explored below.9 It is surmised that this intermingling of concepts in 
Comboni stems from a lack of terminological clarity. Hence it is 
suggested that we heed Lord Millett’s advice in Dubai Aluminium and 
abandon reference to the constructive trust when referring to an 
equitable duty to account. The ambit of this paper is to explore the 
“constructive trust” when it is used in a proprietary sense and not in 
circumstances where there is an equitable duty to account. 
                                                                       
5 See Paragon Finance plc v DB Thakerar & Co [1999] 1 All ER 400 at 408–410. 
6 L D Smith, “Constructive Trusts and Constructive Trustees” (1999) 58 CLJ 294 
at 300–301. 
7 [2003] 2 AC 366 at [142]. 
8 [2007] 2 SLR 1020. 
9 See paras 18–22. 
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III. The institutional and remedial puzzle 
6 Another perennial difficulty with the constructive trust is the 
perceived dichotomy between institutional constructive trusts and 
remedial constructive trusts. It is often said that the English conception 
of the constructive trust is that of an institution whereas the American 
view of the constructive trust is that it is a remedy. 
A. The origins of the institutional and remedial constructive trust 
dichotomy 
7 What exactly does this dichotomy mean? Unfortunately, the 
difference between the institutional and remedial forms of constructive 
trust is not sufficiently clarified either in the case law or in the 
textbooks. It is therefore necessary to unpack the supposed distinction 
between these two models of constructive trust. The origin of the 
dichotomy has often been attributed to Dean Roscoe Pound’s article in 
the Harvard Law Review.10 Pound wrote: 
An express trust is a substantive institution. Constructive trust, on the 
other hand, is purely a remedial institution. As the chancellor acts 
in personam, one of the most effective remedial expedients at his 
command was to treat a defendant as if he were a trustee and put 
pressure upon his person to compel him to act accordingly. 
8 On closer reading, Pound was writing purely about US law and 
was not engaged in a comparative analysis of English and US law. 
Furthermore, Pound did not purport to make a distinction between an 
institutional and a remedial constructive trust. In fact, Dean Pound 
thought both the express and the constructive trust were institutions. It 
was probably Prof Ronald Maudsley, a distinguished English equity 
scholar writing in 1959 in the Law Quarterly Review, who first pointed 
to a dichotomy between the institutional and the remedial constructive 
trust. Maudsley asserted:11 
Modern American legal thought thinks more of a constructive trust as 
a remedy, but admits that occasionally it can be an institution. English 
law has always thought of a constructive trust as an institution, a type 
of trust. 
9 On reflection, this supposed difference between institutional 
and remedial constructive trusts is a false distinction. With all respect to 
Maudsley, the error stems from a misreading of Pound’s work. Pound 
                                                                       
10 R Pound, “The Progress of the Law – Equity” (1919–20) 33 Harv L Rev 420 at 420–421. 
11 R H Maudsley, “Proprietary Remedies for the Recovery of Money” (1959) 
75 LQR 234 at 237. See also D Waters, The Constructive Trust: The Case for a New 
Approach in English Law (Athlone Press, 1964) at pp 9–19. 
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evidently thought that both express and constructive trusts were 
institutions, albeit that the latter was a remedial institution. Also, the 
word “institution”, as used in this context, is unduly confusing. Craig 
Rotherham believes that the word institution here means merely a 
matter of established practice.12 If this is the correct understanding of 
the word “institution”, then it does not seem very advantageous to 
describe a constructive trust as being remedial or institutional. Professor 
Peter Birks likewise admitted to being “floored” by the choice of the 
term “institution” to describe the constructive trust. In his view, laws can 
be viewed as institutions because they set up “an intelligible structure 
for achieving certain ends”. However, this meaning of institutions does 
not take us very far, nor does it necessarily add to our comprehension of 
the constructive trust. Birks thought the term most inappropriate and, 
in this context, unusable.13 
10 In any case, the dichotomy between an institutional and a 
remedial constructive trust is unhelpful because it is inaccurate. All 
forms of constructive trust are in a sense remedial. As Deane J explained 
in Muschinski v Dodds:14 
Where an equity court would retrospectively impose a constructive 
trust by way of equitable remedy, its availability as such a remedy 
provides the basis for, and governs the content of, its existence 
inter partes independently of any formal order declaring it or 
enforcing it. In this more limited sense, the constructive trust is also 
properly seen as both ‘remedy’ and ‘institution’. Indeed, for the student 
of equity, there can be no true dichotomy between the two notions … 
11 Therefore I would argue that the terminology of “institutional 
constructive trust” should be abandoned in Singapore. However, this 
appears to be a move that may be undertaken only by the Singapore 
Court of Appeal. This is because the highest courts in England and 
Singapore have continued to refer to the dichotomy between an 
institutional constructive trust and a remedial constructive trust in 
relatively recent decisions. 
                                                                       
12 C Rotherham, Proprietary Remedies in Context (Hart, 2002) at p 12. 
13 P Birks, “Can Sense Be Made of the Remedial Constructive Trust?” (paper 
delivered at the University of Western Australia Law School on 22 September 
1999). Cf L Smith, “Philosophical Foundations of Proprietary Remedies” in 
Philosophical Foundations of the Law of Unjust Enrichment (R Chambers et al eds) 
(Oxford, 2009) at p 281 for a defence of the constructive trust based on historical 
institutional practices and an understanding of the law of obligations. 
14 (1985) 160 CLR 583 at 614. 
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B. The Singapore cases on the remedial constructive trust 
12 The House of Lords’ decision in Westdeutsche Landesbank 
Girozentrale v Islington LBC15 is the most significant case on the remedial 
constructive trust in recent times.16 Westdeutsche has been cited a 
number of times in Singapore and it is therefore profitable to examine 
this decision in detail. In this case, the claimant bank entered into an 
interest rate swap contract with the defendant who was a local authority. 
Unfortunately, the contract was ultra vires the defendant: local 
authorities in England were not empowered to enter into such contracts. 
In this swap contract, the claimant had paid a tranche of money to the 
defendant. Since the contract was ultra vires, the claimant brought an 
action against the defendant for restitution of the money paid plus 
compound interest. One of the grounds put forward in support of the 
claim for compound interest was the assertion that a resulting trust had 
arisen in favour of the claimant pursuant to the ultra vires contract. This 
assertion was rejected. What is crucial to the discussion at hand is that 
although Lord Browne-Wilkinson said that a resulting trust was 
inappropriate on the facts of this case, he hinted that the remedial 
constructive trust may provide a more satisfactory doctrinal vehicle for 
developing the law. On the difference between an institutional and a 
remedial constructive trust, Lord Browne-Wilkinson explained: 
Under an institutional constructive trust the trust arises by operation 
of law as from the date of the circumstances which give rise to it: the 
function of the court is merely to declare that such trust has arisen in 
the past. The consequences that flow from such trust having arisen 
(including the potentially unfair consequences to third parties who in 
the interim have received the trust property) are also determined by 
rules of law, not under a discretion. A remedial constructive trust, as I 
understand it, is different. It is a judicial remedy giving rise to an 
enforceable equitable obligation: the extent to which it operates 
retrospectively to the prejudice of third parties lies in the discretion of 
the court. 
13 His Lordship pointed out that the remedial constructive trust 
may be tailored to the circumstances of the case, allowing the court to 
take into account third party rights and all appropriate defences. 
Lord Browne-Wilkinson said, moreover, that whether English law 
should follow the US and Canada in adopting the remedial constructive 
                                                                       
15 [1996] AC 669 (noted H Tjio, “Swaps: Compound Interest and Equitable 
Proprietary Interest” [1996] Sing JLS 608). See also T Etherton, “Constructive 
Trusts: A New Model for Equity and Unjust Enrichment” (2008) 67 CLJ 256 
at 266–270. 
16 See also Thorner v Major [2009] 1 WLR 776 at [14] and [20]–[21], where Lord 
Scott preferred to characterise the facts as justifying a remedial constructive trust 
rather than a remedy pursuant to proprietary estoppel. 
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trust was not directly in issue in the instant case and was a matter which 
remained to be explored in future. 
14 Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s hint that the remedial constructive 
trust might be a matter of further development has not been taken up in 
subsequent cases in England. This is due, in large measure, to the strong 
sentiments expressed against the remedial constructive trust in Re Polly 
Peck International Plc (No 2).17 This case involved an application to 
commence legal action against Polly Peck International Plc (“Polly 
Peck”), which was an insolvent company under an administration order. 
Polly Peck’s administrators objected to the claim because they 
contended that the draft statement of claim did not disclose a seriously 
arguable case under English law. One of the principal claims in that 
draft statement of claim was that the applicants were entitled to a 
remedial constructive trust over the proceeds of sale of shares held by 
the subsidiaries of Polly Peck. This claim was given short shrift by the 
Court of Appeal. Mummery LJ said: “[t]he insolvency road is blocked 
off to remedial constructive trusts, at least when judge driven in a 
vehicle of discretion.” Nourse LJ was similarly emphatic and said that it 
was not seriously arguable that a remedial constructive trust would be 
imposed. His Lordship added that, even if Polly Peck had been solvent, 
an Act of Parliament would have been needed to authorise the variation 
of proprietary rights. Polly Peck has been followed in a number of 
English cases.18 
15 In contrast to Polly Peck, the Singapore courts have not been 
overtly hostile to the concept of the remedial constructive trust. After 
Westdeutsche, the first case that considered the remedial constructive 
trust was Public Prosecutor v Intra Group (Holdings) Co Inc.19 
Mr Chotirmall was instructed by the managing director of a Panama 
company, Intra Group (Holdings) Co Inc (“Intra”) to purchase a 
residential property in Tanjong Rhu Road for S$245,000 in 1979. Intra 
                                                                       
17 [1998] 3 All ER 812 (noted P Birks, “The End of the Remedial Constructive Trust” 
(1998) 12 TLI 202). 
18 See OJSC Oil Company Yugraneft v Roman Arkadievich Abramovich [2008] 
EWHC 2613 (Comm); Sinclair Investment Holdings SA v Versailles Trade Finance 
Limited [2007] EWHC 915; Ultraframe (UK) Ltd v Gary Fielding [2005] 
EWHC 1638; Freeman v HM Commissioners of Customs and Excise [2005] BCC 506; 
Cobbold v Bakewell Management Ltd [2003] EWHC 2289; Compagnie Commerciale 
Andre SA v Artibell Shipping Company Limited 2001 SC 653 OH. Cf London Allied 
Holdings Limited v Anthony Lee [2007] EWHC 2061, where Etherton J thought that 
although English courts would be slow to follow the US and Canadian model of the 
constructive trust, there is the possibility of developing a form of discretionary 
constructive trust based on proprietary estoppel principles. 
19 [1999] 1 SLR 803 (discussed in M Hwang, A Chan & K Low, “Developments in the 
Law of Equity” in Developments in Singapore Law Between 1996–2000 (K Tan ed) 
(Singapore Academy of Law and National University of Singapore, 2001) at 
pp 450–452). 
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gave Mr Chotirmall the purchase price and money to renovate the 
property. The agreement was that Mr Chotirmall would hold the 
property on trust for Intra. However, this trust arrangement 
contravened the Residential Property Act: foreign persons (including 
companies) are not entitled to purchase certain types of residential 
property in Singapore unless they have obtained approval from the 
Comptroller of Residential Property. Mr Chotirmall, a permanent 
resident in Singapore, had obtained the necessary approval from the 
Comptroller of Residential Property to buy the property in his own 
name. Nevertheless, Mr Chotirmall and Intra did not disclose the trust 
relationship to the Comptroller of Residential Property. The Residential 
Property Act specifically prohibits the creation of trusts in respect of 
residential property in favour of any foreign person. Without the 
consent of Intra, Mr Chotirmall sold the property in 1994 for S$11m. 
Intra lodged a police report against Mr Chotirmall and Mr Chotirmall 
was charged with contravening the Residential Property Act. The 
Commercial Affairs Department took action to locate and seize the 
proceeds of the sale. Counsel for Intra argued that even though no 
express trust could arise with respect to the property, Intra was the 
beneficiary of a constructive trust of the proceeds of the sale. Yong Pung 
How CJ rejected this argument, saying that if the Residential Property 
Act does not permit Intra’s claim “to bite on the property, neither can it 
bite on the proceeds. A proprietary claim premised on a constructive 
trust cannot … ‘lay dormant’: it either exists or it does not”.20 Yong CJ 
noted Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s comments in Westdeutsche on the 
possibility of developing the remedial constructive trust. The Chief 
Justice said he did not propose to consider the applicability of the 
doctrine of remedial constructive trust in the present case. Thus, in 
contrast to the hostile attitude of the English Court of Appeal in Re Polly 
Peck, the development of the remedial constructive trust remains a 
possibility in Singaporean jurisprudence. 
16 The first Singapore case to grapple with the remedial 
constructive trust in any meaningful way was Ching Mun Fong v Liu Cho 
Chit.21 In this case, the plaintiff, Madam Ching, sued the defendant, 
Mr Liu, on behalf of her late husband, Mr Tan. The plaintiff prayed for a 
declaration of remedial constructive trust over the assets of the 
defendant. The allegation was that Mr Tan had agreed to buy land from 
Mr and Mrs Liu at a price of “$3.8m net of tax”. Toward this end, 
Mr Tan paid Mr Liu US$642,451.04 as part of the purchase price in 
1981. It turned out that neither Mr nor Mrs Liu had any interest in the 
                                                                       
20 [1999] 1 SLR 803 at [26]. 
21 [2001] 3 SLR 10 (discussed in M Hwang, A Chan & K Low, “Developments in the 
Law of Equity” in Developments in Singapore Law Between 1996–2000 (K Tan ed) 
(Singapore Academy of Law and National University of Singapore, 2001) at 
pp 451–455). 
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land. The plaintiff ’s claim in the present case was characterised as a 
claim for money had and received on the ground that the money was 
paid pursuant to: (a) a mistaken assumption that Mr and Mrs Liu had 
an interest in the land; and/or (b) a consideration that had totally failed. 
The defendant attempted to strike out the claim on the basis that it was 
time-barred. In order to take advantage of a more favourable limitation 
period,22 the plaintiff argued that the court should declare a constructive 
trust over the sum of US$642,451.04 paid to Mr Liu. L P Thean JA 
refused to entertain the plea of remedial constructive trust. The 
following principles seem to emerge from the judgment. 
(a) “[A] remedial constructive trust is a restitutionary 
remedy which the court, in appropriate circumstances, gives by 
way of equitable relief.”23 
(b) “[T]he payee’s conscience must have been affected, 
while the moneys in question still remain with him.”24 
(c) Where “the payee learns of the mistake only after the 
moneys have got mixed with other funds or dissipated, no 
constructive trust in respect of these moneys can arise. This is 
because there would no longer be an identifiable fund for the 
trust to bite.”25 
17 On the facts, the money which was paid had not been intended 
to be kept distinct as an identifiable fund. Furthermore, the money had 
already been spent or mixed with Mr Liu’s other funds. The Court of 
Appeal therefore held that no remedial constructive trust could be 
declared on the facts of this case. Ching Mun Fong is a significant ruling 
because it does not reject outright the concept of the remedial 
constructive trust. Rather, L P Thean JA attempted to lay down some 
guiding principles as to when a declaration of remedial constructive is 
inappropriate, namely, when the funds were spent or mixed by the 
defendant. 
18 The difficult case of Comboni Vincenzo v Shankar’s Emporium 
(Pte) Ltd26 (“Comboni”) is also relevant to this discussion of the remedial 
constructive trust. Mr Comboni, the first plaintiff, received an 
unsolicited email from Mr Nsugbe claiming that Mr Nsugbe’s murdered 
father had left US$20m with a security firm in South Africa and that he 
was looking for assistance in investing the money. Mr Comboni, 
a retired banker, licensed financial trustee and an Italian solicitor, 
offered his professional services to Mr Nsugbe. Mr Comboni was also a 
                                                                       
22 Section 22 of the Limitation Act (Cap 163, 1996 Rev Ed). 
23 [2001] 3 SLR 10 at [36]. 
24 [2001] 3 SLR 10 at [36]. 
25 [2001] 3 SLR 10 at [36]. 
26 [2007] 2 SLR 1020. 
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director of the second plaintiff, GB & Associates Inc (“GB”). As a result 
of a meeting between Mr Comboni and Mr Nsugbe, GB signed an 
investment management agreement with Mr Nsugbe. Before money was 
transferred to GB for investment purposes, Mr Comboni was instructed 
to make (and did make) three payments to a Singapore company, 
Shankar’s Emporium (Pte) Ltd (“Shankar”) as the cost of cover for an 
insurance bond to insure the money to be remitted to GB. It later 
transpired that Mr Comboni had been the victim of a massive and 
elaborate fraud. Shankar claimed that it was not privy to the fraud and 
had no knowledge of any wrongdoing. Shankar’s version of the events 
was that Shankar traded with a Nigerian company called Liko. Liko was 
indebted to Shankar and would frequently instruct third parties to pay 
Shankar. Shankar alleged that once payment was made by third parties 
like GB, Shankar would extend further credit and release bills of lading 
to Liko. 
19 In Comboni, Kan Ting Chiu J thought that although there were 
doubts as to whether the remedial constructive trust was part of English 
law, the remedial constructive trust was certainly part of the law of 
Singapore.27 The learned judge said that in the context of a remedial 
constructive trust the vital issues were “what does it mean for a 
recipient’s conscience to be affected, and second whether the defendant’s 
conscience was in fact affected in this case”. Kan J then went on to 
discuss the claim based on knowing receipt and the level of knowledge 
required to establish knowing receipt. On the facts, Kan J found the 
defendant’s conscience not to be affected by the fraudulent scheme. 
Although the defendant was aware of the possibility of fraud, the 
defendant did not have actual or wilful knowledge of the fraud. As such, 
there was prima facie no liability. However, Kan J found that there was 
liability in respect of a sum of US$103,043.39, which was still in the 
defendant’s hands at the date of trial. Kan J reasoned that, at the end of 
the trial, the defendant must have known that these remittances were 
tainted by fraud. Applying Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s judgment in 
Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington LBC,28 Kan J held that 
the recipient’s knowledge of the fraud at the end of the trial was 
unconscionable. Hence, the defendant became a constructive trustee of 
the sum of US$103,043.39. 
20 With respect, Kan J’s analysis in Comboni seems to be a 
conflation of two very distinct kinds of claim relating respectively to 
liability for knowing receipt and the imposition of a remedial 
constructive trust.29 The prerequisite of liability for knowing receipt is 
                                                                       
27 [2007] 2 SLR 1020 at [52]. 
28 [1996] AC 669 at 705. 
29 See T M Yeo, “Restitution” (2007) 8 SAL Ann Rev at 377–381, paras 20.44–20.56. 
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receipt of trust property30 or property impressed with a fiduciary duty.31 
Without the satisfaction of this essential requirement, there can be no 
liability for knowing receipt. It is erroneous to link this inquiry to the 
remedial constructive trust. The remedial constructive trust is a very 
different creature. It is a form of a proprietary remedy. A claimant will 
usually argue for a remedial constructive trust when the recipient is 
insolvent in order to gain priority over the rest of the recipient’s 
creditors. Here, however, there was no need for a remedial constructive 
trust to be asserted as it did not appear that Shankar was in financial 
difficulty. A personal claim in unjust enrichment based on mistake 
would have sufficed. The conflation of knowing receipt and remedial 
constructive trust was unnecessary. On the facts, it is very difficult to 
justify the defendant’s liability for knowing receipt as there was no trust 
property or property impressed with a fiduciary obligation. 
21 Kan J’s finding in Comboni that the defendant was liable in 
respect of US$103,043.39 is undoubtedly correct. However, the manner 
in which Kan J reached this conclusion is controversial. Ultimately, this 
case should have been analysed on the principle of unjust enrichment.32 
The framework of analysis should have been as follows: (a) Was there an 
enrichment? (b) Was the enrichment at the plaintiff ’s expense? (c) Was 
there a recognised ground of restitution? and (d) Were there any 
defences?33 Questions (a) and (b) are relatively uncontroversial in this 
context. Similarly, inquiry (c) is also satisfied because mistake is a 
recognised “unjust factor” in Singapore.34 The main issue in this case 
would be whether the defendant had changed its position35 in good faith 
on the receipt of the moneys when it credited the sums of money to 
several Nigerian parties. In respect of the US$103,043.39, there was 
clearly no change of position as the alleged change of position (loss 
suffered as a result of US freezing order proceedings) was too tenuous to 
be linked to the receipt of the moneys. With respect, Comboni is a case 
where concepts of knowing receipt, unconscionability and the remedial 
constructive trust were unnecessarily conflated. This decision represents 
                                                                       
30 See Caltong (Australia) Pty Ltd v Tong Tien See Construction Pte Ltd [2002] 3 SLR 241. 
31 CMS Dolphin Ltd v Simonet [2001] BCLC 704. 
32 On the law of unjust enrichment applying in Singapore, see eg Info-communications 
Development Authority of Singapore v Singapore Telecommunications Ltd (No 2) 
[2002] 3 SLR 488. 
33 See eg Info-communications Development Authority of Singapore v Singapore 
Telecommunications Ltd (No 2) [2002] 3 SLR 488; Banque Financière de la Cité v 
Parc (Battersea) Ltd [1999] AC 221 at 227. 
34 MCST No 473 v De Beers Jewellery Pte Ltd [2002] 2 SLR 1. 
35 On change of position, see Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale [1991] 2 AC 548; Seagate 
Technology Pte Ltd v Goh Han Kim [1995] 1 SLR 17 (noted T M Yeo, “Restitution, 
Change of Position and Compensation” [1995] Sing JLS 209). See also J Palmer, 
“Chasing the Will-o’the-Wisp? Making Sense of Bad Faith and Wrongdoers in 
Change of Position” [2005] 13 RLR 53; H W Tang, “The Role of Negligence and 
Non-Financial Detriment in the Law of Unjust Enrichment” [2006] RLR 55. 
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a missed opportunity to develop Singapore’s law of unjust enrichment 
and especially the change of position defence. 
22 Before leaving the Singapore cases on the remedial constructive 
trust, it is also worth mentioning the case of Re Pinkroccade Educational 
Services Pte Ltd.36 Although not couched in terms of remedial 
constructive trust, this case adopted Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s 
rationalisation of Chase Manhattan Bank NA v Israel-British Bank 
(London) Ltd37 in Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington 
LBC.38 The claim arose in the context of the winding up of Pinkroccade 
Educational Services Pte Ltd (“Pinkroccade”). The claimant, PT HM 
Sampoerna TBK (“Sampoerna”), an Indonesian company, had engaged 
an Australian company, Pink Elephant International Pte Ltd (“Pink 
Elephant”), to conduct various courses for its staff in Indonesia. For this 
service Pink Elephant rendered an invoice for AUD$135,608 to 
Sampoerna’s Singapore office. Sampoerna instructed its bank to make a 
payment of AUD$112,472 on the invoice. Unfortunately, the instruction 
incorrectly cited the bank account of Pinkroccade (then known as PDA 
Pink Elephant Pte Ltd). The payment was made on 30 January 2002 and 
Sampoerna realised its mistake on 8 February 2002. Pinkroccade was 
insolvent by January and was already preparing to go into voluntary 
winding up. The liquidators were formally appointed on 18 March 2002 
when the special resolution to wind up the company was passed, but 
even by early March the company was effectively inoperative and the 
liquidators had already begun to prepare for Pinkroccade’s liquidation. 
What is relevant in the present case is that when the (as yet 
unappointed) liquidators were informed of the mistake by Sampoerna, 
they held themselves out as being in a position to deal with the matter. 
23 Undoubtedly, Sampoerna had a valid claim to recover the 
money as the funds were paid under a mistake. However, such a 
personal claim would have left Sampoerna in the position of an 
unsecured creditor and therefore unlikely to be able to recover the full 
sum. The case therefore focused on whether Sampoerna could somehow 
step outside the statutory scheme of distribution. This Sampoerna 
sought to do in two ways: first, by arguing that the Ex parte James39 
principle applied; and second, by claiming that a constructive trust had 
arisen on the facts of the case. It is the second argument that is relevant 
to this paper. Sampoerna’s argument on the constructive trust 
proceeded in two stages. First, Sampoerna attempted to rely on the 
holding of Chase Manhattan itself, viz a mistaken payer retains an 
                                                                       
36 [2002] 4 SLR 867 (noted by T E Chan, “Revisiting Ex Parte James” [2003] Sing JLS 557). 
37 [1981] Ch 105. 
38 [1996] AC 669. 
39 (1874) LR 9 Ch App 609. See also Re PCChip Computer Manufacturer (S) Pte Ltd 
[2001] 3 SLR 296, which applied this decision. 
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equitable interest in the moneys so paid, arguing that this principle had 
been applied in Singapore by Goh Joon Seng J in Standard Chartered 
Bank v Sin Chong Hua Electric & Trading Pte Ltd.40 Lee Seiu Kin JC (as 
he then was) rejected this argument. The judge took the view that Goh J 
had not relied on Chase Manhattan for the holding that a mistaken 
payer retained an equitable interest in the moneys so paid, but rather for 
the proposition that such an interest allowed the plaintiff in Standard 
Chartered Bank v Sin Chong Hua Electric & Trading Pte Ltd to trace the 
money. Lee JC preferred the view of Lord Browne-Wilkinson in 
Westdeutsche Landesbank to the effect that mere receipt of a mistaken 
payment, without knowledge of the mistake, was incapable of triggering 
the declaration of a constructive trust. On the facts, the defendant had 
knowledge that the moneys were paid by mistake before the winding-up 
resolution was passed. Furthermore, the moneys were in an identifiable 
fund in a separate account which was not mixed with the other funds of 
the company. This last factor was given special significance by Lee JC. 
Finally, Lee JC also pointed out that this was a situation where there was 
no commercial or contractual relationship between Sampoerna and 
Pinkroccade; it was simply a case of a mistaken payment to a third party. 
Thus, Lee JC declared that Pinkroccade held the moneys on a 
constructive trust for the benefit of Sampoerna prior to winding up. 
C. Reflections on the remedial constructive trust 
24 Ultimately, the debate as to whether the constructive trust is 
institutional or remedial in nature conceals the real question at hand: 
what is the appropriate methodology for dealing with the future 
development of the law in this area?41 In other words, is it legitimate to 
admit new categories of case where a constructive trust may be declared 
and, if so, how are these new categories determined? This issue opens up 
difficult doctrinal issues and philosophical problems of accommodating 
public policy in judicial law making. The latter is especially difficult as 
the declaration of a constructive trust has important implications when 
the defendant is insolvent. These tricky problems are not new questions, 
nor are they unique to the law of constructive trusts. For example, tort 
law has struggled for many years to articulate the proper approach in 
developing novel categories of duty of care and in determining how 
public policy should be taken into account in this endeavour.42 While 
                                                                       
40 [1995] 3 SLR 863. 
41 See generally D Wright, The Remedial Constructive Trust (Butterworths, 1998), who 
attempts to rationalise the appropriate factors to consider in choosing the remedy. 
42 For a recent tort decision in Singapore considering this issue, see Spandeck 
Engineering (S) Pte Ltd v Defence Science and Technology Agency [2007] 4 SLR 100 
(noted L Joseph, “Establishing a Duty of Care: Singapore’s Single, Two-stage Test – 
Spandeck Engineering (S) Pte Ltd v Defence Science & Technology Agency” (2008) 
20 SAcLJ 251; K Amirthalingam, “Lord Atkin and the Philosopher’s Stone: The 
Search for a Universal Test for Duty” [2007] Sing JLS 350. 
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this debate has taken place robustly in tort law, a similar debate has not 
been fully ventilated in the law of constructive trust. Unfortunately, 
discussion of the development of new applications of the constructive 
trust has been stunted by the assertion that English law recognises only 
an institutional constructive trust and not a remedial constructive trust. 
The former represents a conservative point of view in developing the 
law in this area, ie a constructive trust will be declared only if there are 
precedents to support the declaration of such a trust; otherwise, it is 
illegitimate to declare a constructive trust because to do so is to adopt a 
remedial view of the constructive trust which is foreign to English law. 
A strict adherence to the supposed rule that the law recognises only the 
institutional constructive trust means that the law may never admit new 
categories of situation where it is appropriate to declare a constructive 
trust. 
25 This traditional approach to constructive trust jurisprudence, in 
referring to the dichotomy between the institutional and the remedial 
constructive trust, is highly unsatisfactory on many levels. First, as 
argued above, the terms “institutional” and “remedial” constructive trust 
obscure the essential question that we are facing, namely, how does the 
law evolve and admit new categories of situation where the declaration 
of a constructive trust is appropriate. It is by no means clear how 
reference to the dichotomy between the institutional and remedial 
constructive trust assists in this inquiry. In fact, I would argue that the 
continued reference to this supposed dichotomy is damaging to 
constructive trust jurisprudence because it conceals the real question. 
Second, the dogmatic assertion that the law recognises only institutional 
constructive trusts and not remedial constructive trusts is tantamount 
to no more than a bald pronouncement that the law will never develop 
new categories of the constructive trust. While there may be defensible 
reasons for taking this position, it is better to articulate the basis for this 
conservative stance rather than simply to make a dogmatic assertion 
that no new categories are permitted. It is also doubtful whether such a 
conservative approach to the development of the law of constructive 
trust is sustainable. There is no reason to suppose that the law is so 
perfect that it should be “frozen” in time in terms of specific pre-existing 
categories; the law must be able to grow to meet changing social 
circumstances. It is surely impossible for judges and jurists to 
pronounce that no expansion of the law is ever allowed. Furthermore, 
there is a logical fallacy to this approach. If this restrictive approach had 
been taken from the very beginning, the law of constructive trust would 
never have developed. Finally, as argued above, the terms “institutional” 
and “remedial” are unhelpful and, ultimately, inaccurate terms to 
describe the constructive trust. All forms of the constructive trust are, in 
a sense, remedial in nature. A very stark illustration of this fact is the 
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constructive trust which may be declared where an equity has arisen in a 
proprietary estoppel claim.43 A constructive trust in this category is no 
doubt an institutional constructive trust because there are many 
established precedents supporting this proposition.44 However, the law 
on whether to declare a constructive trust in the context of proprietary 
estoppel is remedial and discretionary. Judges have said, in deciding on 
the award of remedies, that they would order the minimum equity to do 
justice between the parties,45 look at the context of the relationship to 
determine whether the case is a “bargain” or “non-bargain case”,46 the 
certainty of the representation,47 the proportionality between the 
remedy and detriment,48 whether the equity has been spent,49 the need 
for a clean break, and so on.50 Thus, even within the so-called 
institutional constructive trust, we are able to discern a very strong 
remedial flavour to the declaration of a constructive trust. 
26 What then is the proper approach to developing new categories 
of constructive trust in Singapore? It is suggested that general guidance 
may be obtained from V K Rajah JA’s decision in Lau Siew Kim v Yeo 
Guan Chye Terence.51 Although this is a decision on resulting trust and 
the presumption of advancement, there are valuable observations on the 
general principles of equity that may be pertinent to the issue at hand. 
Several themes on the future development of equity emerge from this 
important decision. First, the theoretical basis of the existence of equity 
is to function as a “body of principles which has evolved progressively to 
mitigate the severity sometimes occasioned by the rigid application of 
the rules of the common law”. Invoking Aristotle, the learned judge saw 
                                                                       
43 See eg Hong Leong Singapore Finance Ltd v United Overseas Bank Ltd [2007] 
1 SLR 292. On the remedy granted when an equity had arisen, see generally 
S Gardner, “The Remedial Discretion in Proprietary Estoppel – Again” (2006) 
122 LQR 492; A Robertson, “The Reliance Basis of Proprietary Estoppel Remedies” 
[2008] Conv 295; R Walker, “Which Side ‘Ought to Win’? – Discretion and 
Certainty in Property Law” [2008] Sing JLS 229; K Gray & S F Gray, Elements of 
Land Law (Oxford, 5th Ed, 2009) at pp 1240–1258. 
44 See eg cases discussed in K Gray & S F Gray, Elements of Land Law (Oxford, 5th Ed, 
2009) at pp 1253–1254. Cf Thorner v Major [2009] 1 WLR 776 at [14] and [20]–[21]. 
45 Crabb v Arun DC [1976] Ch 179 at 198. Applied in Singapore in LS Investment Pte 
Ltd v Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura [1998] 3 SLR 754; Ong Beng Chong v Jayaram 
Victoria [2009] SGHC 66. 
46 Jennings v Rice [2003] 1 P & CR 100. 
47 Jennings v Rice [2003] 1 P & CR 100. Applied in Singapore in Hong Leong Singapore 
Finance Ltd v United Overseas Bank Ltd [2007] 1 SLR 292. 
48 Jennings v Rice [2003] 1 P & CR 100. Applied in Singapore in Hong Leong Singapore 
Finance Ltd v United Overseas Bank Ltd [2007] 1 SLR 292. See also Yeoman’s Row 
Management Ltd v Cobbe [2008]1 WLR 1752 (noted by B McFarlane & 
A Robertson, “The Death of Proprietary Estoppel” [2008] LMCLQ 449). 
49 Chiam Heng Luan v Chiam Heng Hsien [2007] 4 SLR 305. 
50 Gillett v Holt [2001] Ch 210. 
51 [2008] 2 SLR 108 (noted K Low, “Apparent Gifts: Re-examining the Equitable 
Presumptions” (2008) 124 LQR 369). 
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this branch of jurisprudence as a “rectification of law where the law falls 
short by reason of its universality”. Second, there is a desire to develop 
equity in a principled and certain manner and avoiding “palm tree” 
justice, where the law is dispensed on the basis of an individual judge’s 
subjective view of fairness. Finally, care must be taken so as not to calcify 
equity so that it is incapable of developing in a way which mitigates the 
rigours of the common law. These twin policy concerns (of maintaining 
flexibility and being principled) present an inherent tension in equity. In 
balancing these competing policies, V K Rajah JA said “courts should be 
principled and pragmatic when resolving the tension of applying an 
unguided and untrammelled discretion as an antidote to the blind 
acceptance of inflexible hard and fast rules”. Reiterating Bagnall J’s 
iconic statement in Cowcher v Cowcher52 that “[t]his does not mean that 
equity is past childbearing; simply that its progeny must be legitimate – 
by precedent out of principle”, Rajah JA identified four primary 
perspectives as guidance for the court in the future development of 
equitable principles. The learned judge said that when a court is 
presented with a legal dispute, it must pay regard to: (a) precedent; 
(b) principle; (c) policy; and (d) pragmatism. Rajah JA succinctly said 
that “[p]rincipled pragmatism should be the key to the court’s approach 
in the application of equitable principles”. It is suggested that all these 
themes are relevant to discussion of the future development of the 
constructive trust. 
27 Identifying the basic themes relevant to how the law of 
constructive trust should evolve is just the starting point of a difficult 
inquiry. In this paper, I do not claim to be able to offer a solution of all 
the issues related to the constructive trust. Rather, the purpose of this 
paper is to provide a framework for the development of the law and 
highlight the unresolved problems which have hitherto been obscured 
by the dogmatic assertion that English law recognises only the 
institutional constructive trust and not the remedial constructive trust. 
Diving down to the particulars, there are many doctrinal and policy 
concerns which remain unsettled. The doctrinal difficulties include: 
(a) the confusion between the elements of a remedial constructive trust 
and knowing receipt;53 and (b) the level and the timing of the knowledge 
that is required to affect the conscience of the recipient in a case of a 
mistaken payment. Issue (a) is relatively easy to sort out. As argued 
above, the constructive trust, at least used in a proprietary sense, ought 
to be disentangled from the action of knowing receipt. As to the second 
issue, the prescription of the relevant level of knowledge on the 
recipient’s part in the context of a mistaken payment is slightly more 
difficult. What forms of knowledge apart from actual knowledge should 
compel the courts to declare a constructive trust? Also, what is the 
                                                                       
52 [1972] 1 WLR 425 at 430. 
53 Comboni Vincenzo v Shankar’s Emporium (Pte) Ltd [2007] 2 SLR 1020. 
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relevant time to assess the level of knowledge? On a more general and 
philosophical level, the questions that need to be addressed are as 
follows. What is the justification for the declaration of a constructive 
trust in certain cases? Should public policy factors be taken in 
developing the law of constructive trust? If so, what is the relevance in 
this inquiry of the insolvency of the recipient? Are third parties’ interests 
(eg rights of unsecured creditors) relevant in deciding whether to 
declare a constructive trust? Apart from mistaken payments, should a 
constructive trust be declared in other situations where the transferor’s 
intent can be said to be vitiated? How do we deal with the criticism that 
in declaring a constructive trust, the courts are engaging in an exercise 
which is essentially an illegitimate redistribution of property rights 
between private parties? The Singapore Court of Appeal will have to 
deal with these difficult doctrinal and policy inquiries at some point in 
time if they wish to develop the law of constructive trust coherently. 
IV. The explanatory puzzle 
28 Quite apart from imprecise terminology and being bogged 
down in the unhelpful institutional and remedial debate, constructive 
trust jurisprudence has also not benefitted from a sound theoretical 
foundation. The constructive trust seems to arise in a wide array of 
seemingly unconnected categories. A non-exhaustive list includes 
situations where there is: 
(a) a binding contract for the disposition of an interest in 
land;54 
(b) a breach of trust;55 
(c) a transfer of property subject to a condition;56 
                                                                       
54 Lysaght v Edwards (1876) 2 Ch D 499. Applied in Singapore in Cheng-Wong Mei 
Ling Theresa v Oei Hong Leong [2006] 2 SLR 637. 
55 Keech v Sandford (1726) Sel Cas T King 61. 
56 Binions v Evans [1972] Ch 359; Lyus v Prowsa Developments [1982] 1 WLR 1044. 
These cases have been applied in Singapore in Ho Kon Kim v Lim Gek Kim Betsy 
[2001] 4 SLR 340. See also Leong Sze Hian v Teo Ai Choo [1984–1985] SLR 345. 
However, the courts in Leong Sze Hian chose to rationalise the trust as an express 
trust. For secondary literature on this issue, see S Bright, “The Third Party’s 
Conscience in Land Law” [2000] Conv 398, B McFarlane, “Constructive Trusts 
Arising on a Receipt of Property Sub Conditione” (2004) 120 LQR 667. 
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(d) an acquisition of property due to the fraudulent57 or 
unconscionable58 conduct of the defendant; 
(e) a breach of fiduciary duty;59 
(f) a common intention to share property, which common 
intention has been relied on to the detriment of the plaintiff;60 
(g) a mistaken payment in circumstances where the 
defendant has knowledge of the mistake and the moneys are 
still identifiable in a segregated fund;61 
(h) an equity has arisen pursuant to a proprietary estoppel 
claim;62 
(i) a traceable equitable proprietary interest vesting in the 
plaintiff;63 
(j) a Pallant v Morgan equity;64 and 
(k) a breach of confidence.65 
                                                                       
57 Rochefoucauld v Boustead [1897] 1 Ch 196. See N Hopkins, “How Should We 
Respond to Unconscionability? Unpacking the Relationship between Conscience 
and the Constructive Trust” in Contemporary Perspectives on Property (M Dixon & 
G Griffiths eds) (Oxford, 2007) at p 3. 
58 Chase Manhattan Bank v Israel-British Bank [1981] Ch 105, as rationalised by 
Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington LBC [1996] AC 669 at 715. See 
also Standard Chartered Bank v Sin Chong Hua Electric & Trading Pte Ltd [1995] 
3 SLR 863 (noted A Loke, “Reclaiming Moneys Paid under Fraud in Documentary 
Credits” [1996] Sing JLS 251). It would seem here that a constructive trust was 
declared over the traceable proceeds of the mistaken payment. 
59 Boardman v Phipps [1967] 2 AC 46 at 117 (per Lord Guest). On fiduciary  
agents and bribes see Sumitomo Bank Ltd v Kartika Ratna Thahir [1993] 1 SLR 735 
(noted H Tjio, “Rethinking the Personal and Proprietary Distinction” [1993] 
Sing JLS 198). Cf D Crilley, “A Case of Proprietary Overkill” [1994] RLR 57. 
60 Considered in Tan Thiam Loke v Woon Swee Kheng Christina [1992] 1 SLR 232 but 
held not to be applicable on the facts of the case. For a recent restatement of the 
law in the House of Lords, see Stack v Dowden [2007] 2 AC 432. 
61 Chase Manhattan Bank v Israel-British Bank [1981] Ch 105, as rationalised by 
Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington LBC [1996] AC 669 at 715. Applied 
in Singapore in Re Pinkroccade Educational Services Pte Ltd [2002] 4 SLR 867. 
62 See for example Re Basham [1986] 1 WLR 1498; Gillett v Holt [2001] Ch 210. 
63 Foskett v McKeown [2001] AC 102 (noted H W Tang, “Foskett v McKeown – Hard 
Nosed Property Rights or Unjust Enrichment” (2001) 25 MULR 295). See also 
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corp Ltd v United Overseas Bank Ltd [1992] 
2 SLR 495. 
64 [1953] Ch 43. Considered in Ong Heng Chuan v Ong Boon Chuan [2003] 2 SLR 469 
but held not to be applicable on the facts of the case. 
65 LAC Minerals v International Corona Resources (1989) 61 DLR (4th) 14. 
Cf H W Tang “Confidence and the Constructive Trust” (2003) 23 LS 135. See also 
D Sheehan, “Information, Tracing Remedies and the Remedial Constructive Trust” 
[2005] RLR 82; G Wei, “Breach of Confidence, Downstream Losses, Gains and 
Remedies” [2005] Sing JLS 20; M Conaglen, “Thinking about Proprietary 
Remedies for Breach of Confidence” [2008] IPQ 82–109. 
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29 A quick perusal of the categories above suggests that these 
categories appear to be no more than a rag-bag of unrelated situations. 
The challenge for the jurist is to explore whether there are any 
underlying similarities between these categories. Otherwise, it would be 
very difficult to develop the law in this area in a coherent manner. In this 
section, I consider the various explanations for the existence of the 
constructive trust. 
A. The sceptical thesis 
30 The first school of thought is the “sceptical thesis”66 advanced by 
Tony Oakley.67 Oakley is unapologetic about the lack of rationale in this 
area of the law. He points out that the constructive trust “arises quite 
independently of the intention of any parties. Exactly which trusts fall 
within this definition cannot be stated with the same precision.”68 In 
support of this argument, Oakley cites Edmund Davies LJ in Carl-Zeiss 
Stiftung v Herbert Smith (No 2),69 who said: 
English law provides no clear and all-embracing definition of a 
constructive trust. Its boundaries have been left perhaps deliberately 
vague, so as not to restrict the court by technicalities in deciding what 
the justice of a particular case may demand. 
31 Such a flexible philosophy towards the constructive trust is also 
consistent with the US jurisprudence on constructive trust. In an often 
quoted passage in Beatty v Guggenheim Exploration Co,70 Justice Cardozo 
said: “A court of equity in decreeing a constructive trust is bound by no 
unyielding formula. The equity of the transaction must shape the 
measure of the relief.” 
32 Is the search for general principles in this area an unnecessary 
inquiry? I would suggest not. While I have sympathy for the argument 
that the law must not be stated in too rigid terms71 so as to preclude the 
future development of the law, there is the corresponding danger of 
                                                                       
66 This term is borrowed from G Elias, Explaining Constructive Trusts (Oxford, 1990) 
at p 2. 
67 A J Oakley, Constructive Trusts (Sweet & Maxwell, 1997). See also A J Oakley, 
“Restitution and Constructive Trust: A Commentary” in Restitution, Past Present 
and Future (Hart, 1998) (W R Cornish et al eds) at p 219 and p 220 where he 
argues that the most accurate description of the law in England is “the constructive 
trust continues to be seen as an institutional obligation attaching to property in 
certain circumstances” (quoting D Waters). 
68 A J Oakley, Constructive Trusts (Sweet & Maxwell, 1997) at p 1. 
69 [1969] 2 Ch 276 at 300. 
70 122 NE 378 at 381 (NY 1919). See also C Saiman, “Restitution and the Production 
of Legal Doctrine” (2008) 65 Wash & Lee L Rev 993 at 1017–1031 for a recent 
review of the US jurisprudence on the constructive trust. 
71 Lau Siew Kim v Yeo Guan Chye Terence [2008] 2 SLR 108. 
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being unprincipled when the law is left “deliberately vague”. By refusing 
to state general principles, the law risks being accused of dispensing 
palm-tree justice between litigants. It is difficult to think of any other 
area of the law where the courts have refused to set out some general 
guidelines. Equity, ever mindful of the charge of being unprincipled, has 
long asserted that its rules are not dependent on the length of the 
Chancellor’s foot. It is apposite to pay heed to Selden’s articulation in 
the 17th century of the usual complaint of equity: that justice was being 
dispensed according to the each Chancellor’s differing notion of 
conscience.72 Therefore, I would argue that it is incumbent on judges 
and jurists to attempt to rationalise the principles which animate 
situations where a constructive trust may be declared. 
33 It may very well be that I have rather unfairly constructed a 
straw man argument against the sceptical thesis. Perhaps the sceptical 
thesis merely rejects any overarching theories which attempt to explain 
the constructive trust. It may be that the sceptical thesis does not reject 
the fact that for pre-existing categories where a constructive trust may 
be declared, the doctrinal rules have to be tolerably clear with some 
room for development to take into account new situations. For example, 
when we look at the common intention constructive trust, the courts 
have, in effect, laid down specific doctrinal principles (ie common 
intention to share the property and detrimental reliance) which would 
lead to the declaration of a constructive trust.73 However, I would argue 
that merely having clear doctrinal principles in specific categories is not 
enough; it is important that in rationalising the law in this area that we 
take the jurisprudential inquiry to a higher plane and ask the following 
questions. Why does the law respond by declaring a proprietary interest 
in this situation? Is it to honour the agreement between the parties? Or 
is it because there is a policy factor in protecting people in intimate 
relationships? All these questions should be explored in the myriad of 
the categories where a constructive trust has hitherto been declared. If 
we are able to rationalise the various pre-existing categories, this will 
provide a foundation to develop future categories of the constructive 
trust. Without such a rationalisation, future development risks being 
undertaken in an incoherent and haphazard manner. For this reason, 
I would argue that while the sceptical thesis might be an accurate 
description of the law at the moment, it is not a desirable approach to 
take with regard to the future development of the law. 
                                                                       
72 John Selden, Table Talk, newly edited for the Selden Society by Sir Frederick Pollock 
(Quaritch (London), 1927). 
73 See Stack v Dowden [2007] 2 AC 432. 
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B. The conscience school 
34 Another often cited justification of the constructive trust is that 
it arises due to the unconscionable conduct of the defendant. In the 
well-known US decision of Beatty v Guggenheim Exploration Co,74 
Cardozo J used this statement to describe the constructive trust:75 
A constructive trust is the formula through which the conscience of 
equity finds expression. When property has been acquired in such 
circumstances that the holder of the legal title may not in good conscience 
retain the beneficial interest, equity converts him into a trustee. 
[emphasis added] 
35 A similar approach is also found in the English case law. For 
example, Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Westdeutsche Landesbank 
Girozentrale v Islington LBC76 said that a fundamental principle is that 
“equity operates on the conscience of the owner of the legal interest”. 
36 Absent guidelines, the objection to defining situations where 
constructive trust may be declared merely by reference to the 
unconscionable conduct of the defendant lies in the danger that this 
formula is too open-ended. It is incumbent on the courts to give some 
guidance as to how “unconscionable conduct” is identified. 
Unconscionable conduct must mean something more specific than a 
vague appeal to fairness. As La Forest J said in LAC Minerals v 
International Corona Resources: 77 
I do not countenance the view that a proprietary remedy can be 
imposed whenever it is ‘just’ to do so, unless further guidance can be 
given as to what those situations may be. To allow such a result would 
be to leave the determination of proprietary rights to ‘some mix of 
judicial discretion … and “the formless void of individual moral 
opinion”.’ 
37 The problem with unconscionable conduct as the basis of 
liability is that it is very difficult to define such conduct.78 For example, it 
can be said that it is unconscionable for trustees to misuse trust 
property for personal gain. It can equally be said that it is 
                                                                       
74 122 NE 378 (NY 1919). 
75 122 NE 378 (NY 1919) at 380–381. See also Baumgartner v Baumgartner (1987) 
164 CLR 137 at 147, where Mason CJ, and Wilson and Deane JJ, said that “the 
foundation for the imposition of a constructive trust … is that [the defendant’s] 
refusal to recognise the existence of [the plaintiff’s] equitable interest amounts to 
unconscionable conduct and … the trust is imposed as a remedy to circumvent 
that unconscionable conduct”. 
76 [1996] AC 669 at 705. 
77 (1989) 61 DLR (4th) 14 at 51. 
78 See eg Royal Brunei Airlines v Tan [1995] 2 AC 378 at 392 on the need to be clear as 
to what unconscionability means. 
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unconscionable for a person not to take proper care when driving, 
thereby negligently causing injury to a pedestrian. Suppose the errant 
driver becomes insolvent after the accident. Why is it that in the former 
situation, a proprietary remedy may be granted and not in the latter? 
The label “unconscionable conduct” without further elaboration does 
not clarify matters at all in this context. To give another example, 
liability in circumstances where proprietary estoppel may be asserted is 
also often described in terms of the defendant’s unconscionable 
conduct. Yet, when we look at the particulars of a claim in proprietary 
estoppel, there is specific guidance in the case law to assess whether the 
defendant’s conduct is unconscionable, ie the defendant must have 
made certain representations to the plaintiff on which the plaintiff 
relied to his or her detriment. Again, the criticism that the notion of 
unconscionable conduct is uncertain may well be totally misplaced. If 
Lord Browne-Wilkinson had in mind a technical meaning for the word 
“conscience” (as in the doctrine of proprietary estoppel), then the 
formulation of the constructive trust based on conscience may be 
salvaged.79 As such, unconscionability can be viewed as merely a general 
“umbrella principle” which needs to be fleshed out.80 
38 If the future development of the jurisprudence of the 
constructive trust is to be based on the unconscionable conduct of the 
defendant, then the ambit of what is unconscionable conduct has to be 
spelt out by the courts.81 While courts may choose to keep the 
penumbral meaning of unconscionable conduct slightly vague in order 
to retain some degree of flexibility in dealing with new situations,82 the 
core meaning of unconscionable conduct ought to be mapped out with 
sufficient clarity. Otherwise, it would be very difficult for judges to apply 
the law in a consistent manner or for lawyers to advise their clients 
effectively about their rights. It could be argued that the judges have 
already begun the process of stating the key elements of unconscionable 
conduct in this context. For example, in the case of the mistaken 
payment in the Chase Manhattan situation as rationalised by 
Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Westdeutsche, a constructive trust is said to 
be justified in this case because the recipient knew of the mistaken 
payment a matter of days after it was made. A further principle derived 
from the Singapore cases is that there must be a fund for the trust to 
                                                                       
79 See W Swadling, “Property and Conscience” (1998) 12 TLI 228 for a thorough 
analysis of trusteeship arising without knowledge and wrongdoing of the 
defendant. See also R Chambers, Resulting Trusts (Oxford, 1997) at pp 203–210. 
80 See A Phang, “Vitiating Factors in Contract Law – Some Key Concepts and 
Developments” (2005) 17 SAcLJ 148 (arguing consistently for a substantive 
“umbrella principle” of unconscionability in contract law). 
81 See eg G Watt, “Unconscionability in Property Law: A Fairy-Tale Ending?” in 
Contemporary Perspectives on Property (M Dixon & G Griffiths eds) (Oxford, 2007) 
at p 117. 
82 See eg Chwee Kin Keong v Digilandmall.com Pte Ltd [2005] 1 SLR 502. 
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“bite on”.83 In other words, the funds must be segregated before a 
constructive trust may be declared. 
39 Nevertheless, there remains a lot of work to be done. 
Unconscionability can operate as the umbrella principle under which a 
constructive trust is declared only if the core meaning of 
unconscionable conduct is defined. This is a task which the courts will 
have to undertake in future cases. Also, it is hoped that the courts will 
develop constructive trust jurisprudence by exploring questions on a 
higher plane. In Chase Manhattan, for example, we should ask the 
following questions. Why is it unconscionable for the defendant to 
retain the money? Why is a proprietary response justified on the facts? 
Why is the knowledge of the defendant so important? Why is it so 
important for the funds to be segregated? A mere assertion of 
unconscionability does not provide the answers to these difficult 
questions. Without exploring these higher questions, we are left with a 
finite list of categories where the constructive trust may be declared. It 
would be very difficult to develop the law beyond these specific 
situations. 
C. The unjust enrichment thesis 
40 Another competing explanation of the constructive trust is the 
unjust enrichment thesis. According to Donovan Waters,84 the 
constructive trust has only one aim: it reverses the unjust enrichment of 
a defendant. This thesis need not hold us for too long. It does not seem 
able to explain all the established categories of situation where a 
constructive trust may be declared unless we take a very expansive view 
of the unjust enrichment principle. Many situations where a 
constructive trust has been declared involve cases where the defendant 
has committed a wrong (eg a breach of fiduciary duty or fraud). If we 
accept that there is a distinction between wrongs and unjust enrichment 
claims,85 then Waters’ thesis does not have sufficient explanatory force to 
justify the declaration of a constructive trust in response to wrongs 
committed by the defendant. Of course, we could include the category 
of wrongs as a species of unjust enrichment in our effort to justify 
Waters’ thesis. On reflection, it is suggested that this strategy is not 
desirable because it takes the focus away from the primary reason why a 
constructive trust is declared, ie the wrongfulness of the defendant’s 
conduct.86 It is far better to bring this factor into focus and then embark 
                                                                       
83 Public Prosecutor v Intra Group (Holdings) Co Inc [1999] 1 SLR 803 at [26]; Ching 
Mun Fong v Liu Cho Chit [2001] 3 SLR 10. 
84 D W M Waters, The Constructive Trust (Athlone Press, 1964). 
85 Much valuable work was done on this issue by Peter Birks. See eg P Birks “The Law 
of Unjust Enrichment: A Millennial Resolution” [1999] Sing JLS 318. 
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on the difficult inquiry as to why certain wrongful conduct triggers a 
proprietary response in law. Nevertheless, it is important to note that to 
reject Waters’ narrow thesis that the sole aim of the constructive trust is 
to reverse a defendant’s unjust enrichment is not necessarily to deny the 
proposition that in certain circumstances a constructive trust may well 
arise in response to the defendant’s unjust enrichment. This latter 
proposition will be investigated below. 
D. The Elias thesis 
41 In his excellent book Dr Gbolahan Elias suggests that the aims 
of the constructive trust are three-fold. He argues:87 
The three aims are to ensure that (1) one who has chosen to dispose of 
his options in favour of another person should abide by the choice; 
(2) one who has made a pecuniary gain through another person’s loss 
gives up the gain to the other person; and (3) one who has caused loss 
to another repairs the loss. These three aims will henceforth be called 
‘the perfection aim’, ‘the restitution aim’, and ‘the reparation aim’ 
respectively – ‘the three aims’ collectively. 
42 Elias’s insight is an important one because it moves away from 
mono-causal theories of the constructive trust (eg unjust enrichment or 
unconscionable conduct) to a multi-causal theory. As a descriptive 
theory of the constructive trust, Elias’s thesis seems to “fit” very well 
with the case law. The perfection aim is able to explain a number of 
situations where the constructive trust arises. For example, the 
perfectionary impulse may explain the constructive trust where: 
(a) there is a specifically enforceable contract to sell a unique subject 
matter;88 (b) the purchaser of land expressly agrees to take subject to the 
interest of a third party;89 (c) there is a common intention constructive 
trust;90 and (d) an equity can be raised against the defendant by reason 
of proprietary estoppel.91 The second aim of the constructive trust 
according to Elias’s multi-causal thesis is that the constructive trust 
responds to the law’s restitutionary impulse. A person who has made 
gains through another person’s loss must give back such gains. It could 
be argued that the basis for a declaration of constructive trust in respect 
                                                                       
87 G Elias, Explaining Constructive Trusts (Oxford, 1990) at p 4. 
88 See eg Lysaght v Edwards (1876) 2 Ch D 499 (contract for sale of land). See also 
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of a mistaken payment in the Chase Manhattan situation is essentially to 
reverse the unjust enrichment of the defendant. Finally, it is argued that 
the third aim of the constructive trust is to make reparation.92 This 
could explain circumstances where a constructive trust is declared in 
response to wrongs such as a breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, 
unconscionable conduct and, possibly, a breach of confidence. 
E. Reflections on explanations for the constructive trust 
43 Eminent judges and scholars have struggled for many years to 
explain the constructive trust. In this short paper I do not pretend to 
offer any definitive conclusion as to which theory should be adopted in 
this area. Instead, the aim of the paper is merely to provide a framework 
or an agenda for discussion of the future development of the law. The 
tentative conclusion reached here is that, among all the theories 
explored above, both the sceptical and the unjust enrichment theses 
should be rejected. With regard to the sceptical thesis, the approach 
leaves too much discretionary space to individual judges in deciding 
whether to declare a constructive trust. Such an approach runs the risk 
of being unprincipled and does not offer any guidance for the future 
development of the law. The unjust enrichment theory is also rejected as 
the sole normative explanation of the myriad situations in which a 
constructive trust may be declared. As a theory, it does not provide a 
good “fit” vis-à-vis the case law. We are thus left with only two serious 
contenders – unconscionable conduct and Elias’s multi-causal theory. 
The argument that a constructive trust is declared because of the 
unconscionable conduct of the defendant is certainly plausible: the 
reference to unconscionable conduct is certainly consistent with the 
language used by the courts. Nevertheless, it is the present author’s view 
that much work remains to be done in defining the scope of what is 
unconscionable conduct. Furthermore, on a general level, it is hoped 
that the courts will explore why certain forms of unconscionable 
conduct trigger a proprietary response in law. Elias’s multi-causal thesis, 
ie that the law of constructive trust is triggered by certain impulses, 
which are essentially about perfection, restitution and reparation, is also 
a promising rationale for the constructive trust. The multi-causality of 
the events which invite declarations of constructive trust is an 
important insight. There is reason to suspect that mono-causal theories 
of the constructive trust are under-inclusive in explaining the 
constructive trust. Elias’s theory provides us with a starting point and a 
useful organising framework for analysis of the constructive trust. Even 
so, difficult questions remain, namely, why do certain perfectionary 
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aims, unjust enrichment claims93 and wrongs94 trigger a proprietary 
response in law? 
V. The bankruptcy puzzle 
44 One of the most contentious issues related to the constructive 
trust is the fact that the constructive trust claimant has priority over the 
general body of the defendant’s creditors in the defendant’s insolvency. 
At the risk of over-simplification, various justifications for this priority 
can be summarised as follows: 
(a) The property in question does not belong beneficially 
to the defendant and it is therefore unobjectionable to declare a 
constructive trust. 
(b) The plaintiff did not accept the risk of the defendant’s 
insolvency. 
(c) If a constructive trust is not declared, the property 
would represent a “windfall” to the defendant’s creditors. In 
other words, the defendant’s creditors would be unjustly 
enriched at the expense of the plaintiff. 
45 Thus, if judges are inclined to develop new categories of 
constructive trust in the context of the defendant’s insolvency, they 
should be mindful of the following factors. (a) The court must 
scrutinise the relevant insolvency provisions in order to determine 
whether the court is subverting the statutory scheme of distribution by 
declaring a constructive trust. (b) The defendant’s creditors must stand 
to be unjustly enriched at the expense of the plaintiff. (c) The plaintiff 
must also establish that he or she has not accepted the risk of the 
defendant’s insolvency. (d) The defendant must be shown to have 
retained the enrichment in the form of a specific asset. 
46 This is another very difficult area that remains under-
investigated in the case law. Scholars are deeply divided on whether it is 
legitimate to declare a constructive trust in situations where the 
defendant is insolvent. On one view, there is no good reason why 
priority should be given to the plaintiff in the event of the defendant’s 
insolvency.95 If this approach is adopted, then the courts should be slow 
                                                                       
93 For an excellent recent exploration of this area, see B Häcker, “Proprietary 
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to develop new categories of constructive trust. On the other hand, there 
is a view that there are indeed persuasive reasons why some classes of 
claimant (eg unjust enrichment claimants) should sometimes be given 
priority in cases of insolvency.96 If this position is taken, then there is 
room for new categories of constructive trust to develop especially in 
the field of unjust enrichment. Again, it is beyond the scope of this essay 
to offer definitive views on this issue. The purpose of this section is to 
signpost this very important issue if new categories of constructive trust 
are to be developed. 
VI. The Torrens puzzle 
47 One of the unresolved issues unique to Singaporean and 
Australian jurisprudence is the question whether declarations of 
constructive trust over registered land are consistent with the Torrens 
scheme of title registration. It is axiomatic that the Torrens statute 
confers indefeasible title on the registered proprietor of land.97 
Indefeasibility of title may be defeated only in limited situations, 
eg where the registered proprietor was privy to fraud or forgery which 
led to the registration of title. The issue here is that there appears to be a 
clash between a declaration of a constructive trust and the principle of 
indefeasibility. Under Torrens jurisprudence a registered proprietor of 
land acquires paramount title to the land. However, a declaration of a 
constructive trust in favour of a third party who is not the registered 
proprietor seems to derogate from the principle of indefeasibility. 
48 There are two prominent Singapore Court of Appeal decisions 
which have examined the constructive trust within the Torrens context. 
In the earlier of these cases, Ho Kon Kim v Lim Gek Kim Betsy (“Betsy 
Lim”),98 L P Thean JA declared the defendant, a registered mortgagee, to 
be a constructive trustee for the plaintiff. In Betsy Lim, Madam Ho had 
an agreement with Betsy Lim that Madam Ho would sell her land to 
Betsy Lim. The agreement provided that Betsy would build three houses 
on the land and re-transfer one house to Madam Ho. Madam Ho 
transferred the land to Betsy. In breach of the agreement, Betsy 
mortgaged the house to RHB Bank (“RHB”). RHB registered their 
mortgage. Under the Land Titles Act,99 a registered mortgagee has 
                                                                       
96 For valuable work in this context, see D M Paciocco, “The Remedial Constructive 
Trust: A Principled Basis For Priorities Over Creditors” (1989) 68 Can Bar Rev 315; 
E L Sherwin, “Constructive Trusts in Bankruptcy” (1989) University of Illinois Law 
Review 297; C Rotherham, Proprietary Remedies in Context (Hart, 2002); H Dagan, 
The Law and Ethics of Restitution (Cambridge, 2004) at pp 297–328. 
97 See generally Tan Sook Yee, H W Tang & K Low, Tan Sook Yee’s Principles of 
Singapore Land Law (LexisNexis, 3rd Ed, 2009), ch 14. 
98 [2001] 4 SLR 340. 
99 Cap 157, 1994 Ed. 
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indefeasibility of title. One of the issues in this case was whether the 
courts had the power to declare RHB to be a constructive trustee of the 
land for Madam Ho. L P Thean JA found the following facts to be 
material: (a) RHB had knowledge of the agreement between Betsy and 
Madam Ho; (b) RHB made an allowance in respect of Madam Ho’s 
interest and discounted this interest in their evaluation of the property; 
and (c) in the agreement between RHB and Betsy, RHB acknowledged 
and committed themselves to honour Madam Ho’s interest in the 
property. L P Thean JA therefore declared a constructive trust in favour 
of Madam Ho. This decision can be said to support the view that 
constructive trust claims may be accommodated within the Torrens land 
system. In contrast, the more recent decision of the Court of Appeal in 
United Overseas Bank Ltd v Bebe bte Mohammad100 seems to deprecate 
this approach. Chan Sek Keong CJ said the “language of this subsection 
[s 46(2)(c) of the Land Titles Act]101 seems to apply only to express trusts 
and not constructive trusts”. Although the Chief Justice did not overrule 
Betsy Lim, Chan CJ preferred to rationalise Betsy Lim as a case which 
could be understood as an instance of Torrens fraud. In other words, 
Madam Ho’s interest prevailed over RHB because RHB’s conduct could 
be characterised as fraudulent within Torrens jurisprudence. 
49 Does a declaration of a constructive trust remain a possibility 
after United Overseas Bank v Bebe? I have argued elsewhere102 that not all 
forms of constructive trust claim are inconsistent with indefeasibility of 
title. The key issue is to determine whether the claim detracts from the 
general principle of indefeasibility.103 Constructive trust claims are tricky 
because they arise in a myriad of circumstances. It is my suggestion that 
not all forms of constructive trust undermine the principle of 
indefeasibility. For example, constructive trusts which are declared on 
the basis of wrongdoing by the defendant are not precluded by the 
Torrens statute. This is because indefeasibility of title was never meant 
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to protect the registered proprietor from his or her own wrongful 
conduct. Indefeasibility of title was devised to protect the registered 
proprietor from a prior title-based claim. On this analysis, constructive 
trusts which arise from situations such as commonly intended beneficial 
ownership or proprietary estoppel clearly do not detract from the 
principle of indefeasibility. Indefeasibility of title does not make the 
registered proprietor immune from claims stemming from such conduct 
as the formation of a common intention to share property with the 
plaintiff or the making representations to the plaintiff which the latter 
has relied on to his or her detriment. However, the Torrens statute 
properly precludes a constructive trust claim by a plaintiff who seeks to 
vindicate his or her equitable title against a registered proprietor who 
has paid value. This is because such a claim is essentially a title-based 
claim which detracts from the principle of indefeasibility of title. 
50 The Betsy Lim case presents a slight challenge. There is an 
argument that here the declaration of a constructive trust detracted in 
substance from the principle of indefeasibility because the claim was 
based primarily on RHB’s knowledge. After all, one of the most 
hallowed principles of Torrens jurisprudence is that mere knowledge of 
a prior claim does not defeat a registered proprietor’s title. On the other 
hand, there is an argument that RHB’s conduct went beyond 
registration of RHB’s interest with mere knowledge of Madam Ho’s 
interest. Apart from the constructive trust analysis, it may also be 
possible to attribute liability to RHB on the basis of: (a) an express 
trust;104 (b) Torrens fraud;105 (c) the tort of conspiracy;106 and (d) the 
enforcement of a contractual provision for a third party.107 On balance, it 
is suggested that the better analysis is that RHB’s conduct involved more 
than mere knowledge of a prior registered interest and that RHB 
inevitably took subject to Madam Ho’s claim. Whether a constructive 
trust analysis is the most appropriate doctrinal vehicle for making RHB 
liable to Madam Ho is beyond the scope of this paper. The main 
argument in this section is that United Overseas Bank v Bebe should not 
be taken to rule out constructive trust claims in the context of Torrens 
land. Rather, each constructive claim must be examined closely on its 
own facts to see whether, in substance, the claim undermines the 
principle of indefeasibility. 
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VII. Conclusion 
51 In this paper I have considered five persistent puzzles often 
associated with the constructive trust. With regard to the terminology 
puzzle, the suggestion is that we should not confuse a personal duty to 
account in equity with the declaration of a constructive trust in a 
proprietary sense. In fact, we should heed the call of many judges and 
scholars to abandon the unnecessary reference to the constructive trust 
in situations where the remedy sought against the defendant comprises 
a personal duty to account. Next, this paper suggests that the 
institutional and remedial puzzle masks a more fundamental question 
in trust jurisprudence, namely whether the courts should recognise new 
categories of situation where a declaration of constructive trust is 
justified? This question leads to the next issue. If new categories are 
possible, how then do we accommodate public policy and judicial 
discretion in their formulation? The assertion that the law recognises 
only the institutional constructive trust is no more than a shorthand for 
saying that the law does not acknowledge the existence of new situations 
where a constructive trust may be declared. Even so, the issue should be 
thoroughly ventilated and debated in the courts. The supposed 
dichotomy between institutional and remedial constructive trusts 
should be abandoned and we should focus on the real questions 
identified above. The conclusion reached with regard to the Torrens 
puzzle is that a constructive trust may be declared over Torrens land 
provided that the claim does not, in substance, detract from the 
principle of indefeasibility. Indefeasibility of title does not protect a 
registered proprietor from the consequences of personal wrongdoing. 
Finally, with regard to the bankruptcy and explanatory puzzles, I have 
merely sought to signpost the main issues at hand. The bankruptcy 
dimension is important because a declaration of constructive trust 
directly affects the defendant’s creditors in the event of insolvency. There 
is, therefore, a need to justify the constructive trust claimant’s priority 
over the defendant’s creditors. The explanatory puzzle is also a 
significant inquiry. It is important to explore whether there are any 
general principles which link the various traditional situations where a 
constructive trust may be declared, since otherwise we would be left 
with simply a rag-bag of jurisprudential categories. These five persistent 
puzzles must be addressed and ultimately unravelled in order to ensure 
the coherent development of the law in the future. 
 
